

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-10

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USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

DIA WASHDC//DI-5//

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 2872

LIMDIS

1. SUMMARY. DENKTASH SAYS BOTH HE AND PRIMIN ECEVIT (BY IMPLICATION NOT ALL TURKISH MILITARY) APPRECIATE THAT TURKS ARE AITHIRING POOR IMAGE THROUGH ACTIONS OF MAINFD MILITARY, AND UNDERSTAND NECESSITY OF IMPROVING THAT IMAGE BY GREATER OPENNESS, COOPERATION WITH UNHCR/ICRC RELIEF EFFORTS AND WITH UNFICYP AND FLEXIBILITY REGARDING REOPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT ETC. HE DECLINED COMMIT HIMSELF ON WHETHER ETHNIC DIVISION OF ISLAND IS OR IS NOT A TURKISH OBJECTIVE BUT ACCEPTS IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TREAT CYPRUS AS AN ECONOMIC UNITY. HE EXPOUNDED AT LENGTH ON GREEK RIGIDITY AT GENEVA AND PROVOCATIONS ON CYPRUS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR TURKS' PHASE TWO MILITARY OPERATION. HE IS WORRIED ABOUT CLERIDES' POSITION. END SUMMARY.

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2. I CALLED ON CYPRUS VP RAUF DENKTASH ON AUG 31, SAME DAY AS

PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS TO ACTING PRESIDENT CLERIDES. MEETING WAS TO HAVE BEEN HELD WITHIN TWO HOURS AFTER THAT WITH CLERIDES BUT WAS POSTPONED UNTIL EVENING AT DENKTASH'S REQUEST DUE TO VISIT OF HIGH-LEVEL DEL FROM MAINLAND.

3. DENKTASH WAS WARM, RELAXED AND WELCOMING. HE RAISED WITH HUMOR HIS OPPOSITION TO MY HAVING PRESENTED CREDENTIALS TO CLERIDES BUT DID NOT PRESS.

4. I SAID I WAS RETURNING TO A CYPRUS IN WHICH POWER POSITIONS OF GREEK AND TURKISH COMMUNITIES HAD BEEN TOTALLY REVERSED AS CONSEQUENCE OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION. IN VICTORY, TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD TO DROP MANY OF ATTITUDES AND PREJUDICES DERIVED FROM PREVIOUS STATUS AS A MINORITY, TREATED AS SECOND CLASS CITIZENS. REALISM, MAGNANIMITY AND FLEXIBILITY WERE REQUIRED TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. TURKISH IMAGE WORLDWIDE WAS FRANKLY NOT GOOD FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS: EXCESSIVE TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIVENESS OF TURKISH MILITARY, UNNECESSARY VIOLENCE, LOOTING AND OTHER UNFORTUNATE LACK OF DISCIPLINE BY SOME MAINLAND TROOPS, CONTINUING VIOLATIONS OF AUG 16 CEASEFIRE, NON-COOPERATION WITH UNFICYP. US ADMINISTRATION PREPARED TO USE ITS FRIENDSHIPS IN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION FAIR TO ALL, BUT ALREADY FACED PROBLEM FROM CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE MANDATORY CUT-OFF OF AID TO TURKEY. THIS PROBLEM BEING COMPOUNDED BY TURKISH ACTIONS DESCRIBED. IT SEEMED TO ME POSSIBLE THAT TURKISH LEADERSHIP IN THIS SITUATION SOMETHING LESS THAN MONOLITHIC. DENKTASH HIMSELF BETTER AWARE THAN ANYONE ELSE OF CYPRIOT NUANCES. PRIMIN ECEVIT WAS A POLITICIAN OF SENSITIVITY AND STATURE. ACTIONS OF TURKISH MILITARY ON CYPRUS, HOWEVER, MIGHT INDICATE THAT TURKISH GENERAL STAFF OR COMMANDERS IN FIELD WERE SETTING SOME OF THEIR OWN RULES.

5. DENKTASH SAID POINTEDLY THAT ECEVIT AND HE WERE SENSITIVE TO THE PROBLEM I HAD OUTLINED. I SUGGESTED CERTAIN THINGS TURKS COULD IMMEDIATELY DO THAT MIGHT HELP THEIR IMAGE. SPECIFICALLY, TURKS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED CEASE ENCROACHMENTS KEYOND CEASEFIRE LINE, COOPERATE WITH INT'L RELIEF EFFORTS AND WITH UNFICYP, GRANT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AND DIP OFFICIALS, BE FLEXIBLE ON A PROMPT REOPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT INITIALLY FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES, PERMIT AT LEAST A LIMITED, EARLY RETURN OF REFUGEES.

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6. I NOTED THAT TURKISH PROVOCATIONS MADE IT ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT FOR CLERIDES AND GOG TO GET BACK INTO NEGOTIATIONS. RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATION WAS KEY OBJECTIVE SINCE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATION IN WHICH PARTIES THEMSELVES WERE PRODUCING IDEAS FOR SOLUTION COULD US PLAY THE USEFUL ROLE WHICH MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE THE KEY TO A FINAL SOLUTION.

7. DENKTASH COMMENTED THAT TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION WOULD

COOPERATE FREELY WITH INTERNATIONAL RELIEF GROUPS, WITNESS HIS INTENTION RECEIVE STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES ON FOLLOWING DAY AND ALLOW THEM VISIT KYRENIA AND OTHER AREAS. HE REALIZED IMPORTANCE OF PROMPT OPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT AND THOUGHT THIS WOULD NOT BE TOO MUCH OF A PROBLEM. COOPERATION WITH UNFICYP IN TERMS OF ALLOWING FREE MOVEMENT WITHIN TURKISH ZONE WAS MORE DIFFICULT GIVEN MANY REPORTS OF UNFICYP PARTISANSHIP FOR GREEKS IN ITS ACTIONS AND REPORTING DURING THE FIGHTING. THERE WAS ALSO A QUESTION OF WHETHER UNFICYP MANDATE STILL VALID IN PRESENT CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. STILL, HE REALIZED IMPORTANCE OF THIS IN TERMS OF IMAGE. NO SUBSTANTIAL RETURN OF REFUGEES POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME FOR SECURITY AND LOGISTIC REASONS. TURKS HAVING HARD ENOUGH TIME COPING WITH INFLUX OF THEIR OWN REFUGEES FROM SOUTH. IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATION SOMETHING WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON THE NEW CITY OF FAMAGUSTA AND ELSEWHERE BUT NEVER IN SUCH PROPORTIONS AS TO LET GREEKS AGAIN BECOME A MAJORITY IN TURKISH ZONE. EVEN NOW, SOME 20-25,000 GREEK CYPRIOTS REMAIN IN NORTH. THIS WAS ALREADY A LARGER MINORITY THAN TURKS HAD CONSTITUTED IN CYPRUS AS A WHOLE BEFORE RECENT EVENTS.

8. I SAID I HOPED TURKS WERE NOT SEEKING EITHER AN ETHNIC OR ECONOMIC DIVISION OF CYPRUS. TO DO SO WOULD BE TO KEEP CYPRUS INDEFINITELY IMPOVERISHED AND SOW THE SEEDS OF FUTURE VIOLENCE. GREEKS AND TURKS LIKELY MIGRATE TO SOME EXTENT VOLUNTARILY AND AS A RESULT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE FEARS, BUT DELIBERATE TURKISH EXCLUSION OF ANY POSSIBILITY OF GREEK REFUGEES RETURNING TO NORTH WOULD BE QUITE A DIFFERENT MATTER, MAKING IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR GREEKS TO RESUME NEGOTIATION. DENKTASH REPEATED THAT TURKSHLID NOT AS A MATTER OF POLICY EXCLUDE SOME LIMITED REFUGEE RETURN. HOWEVER, AN ESSENTIALLY ETHNIC DIVISION WOULD PROBABLY COME ABOUT NATURALLY. HE AGREED THAT ECONOMICALLY IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO DIVIDE CYPRUS.

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9. TURNING TO REASONS FOR TURKEY'S PHASE TWO MILITARY OPERATION AND BY IMPLICATION ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO MY POINT ON EXCESSIVE TERRITORIAL GAIN, DENKTASH SAID GREEKS, AND ESPECIALLY CLERIDES, HAD BROUGHT THIS ON THEMSELVES. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT HOW CLERIDES HAD REJECTED HIS MOST URGENT PERSONAL PLEAS AT GENEVA. THESE PLEAS HAD BEEN BASED ON AWARENESS THAT PATIENCE OF TURKISH GENERAL STAFF WAS ABOUT TO RUN OUT BECAUSE OF HOSTILE GREEK PREPARATIONS ON ISLAND AND PROVOCATIONS TO FIRST ESTABLISHED TURKISH MILITARY POSITION.

10. GOING BACK TO GREEK COUP AND ITS STUPIDITY, DENKTASH SAID EVIDENCE NOW IN TURKISH HANDS (HE DID NOT SAY WHETHER DOCUMENTARY OR RESULTING FROM INTERROGATION) SHOWED THAT COLONELS HAD DRAWN UP A TWO PHASE PLAN TO SETTLE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM THEIR WAY. FIRST PHASE WAS REMOVAL OF MAKARIOS, IN WHICH THEY ESTIMATED TURKISH

ACQUIESCENCE. SECOND PHASE, TO BE LAUNCHED IN NOV WHEN SEAS WERE TOO ROUGH TO PERMIT TURKISH INVASION, WAS TO HAVE BEEN ATTACH (NATURE OF WHICH HE SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL) ON TURKISH ENCLAVE IN NICOSIA AND DISEMBERMENT OF ITS POPULATION. THIS TO BE FOLLOWED BY DECLARATION OF ENOSIS.

11. AT CONCLUSION OF OUR ONE HOUR MEETING, DENKTASH SAID HE FULLY AWARE OF IMPORTANCE OF USG IN OBTAINING THE FAIR AND LASTING SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM FOR WHICH HE SO PROFOUNDLY HOPED. WE COULD COUNT ON HIS COOPERATION. DESPITE SOME ONGOING PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM CURRENT PREDOMINANCE OF MILITARY, HE FELT HE WAS IN A FAR EASIER POSITION TO REPRESENT TURK CYPRIOTS THAN WAS CLERIDES ON HIS SIDE. HE CONTINUED REGARD CLERIDES AS THE MOST SENSIBLE AND MODERATE GREEK CYPRIOT LEADER. HE SERIOUSLY FELT THAT CLERIDES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO SURVIVE THE PRESSURES AGAINST HIM FROM THE DANGEROUS, ARMED AND COMPETING FACTIONS WHICH EXISTED AMONG GREEK CYPRIOTS. I REPLIED THAT I, TOO, WAS GREATLY CONCERNED FOR CLERIDES' FUTURE IN A SITUATION OF MOUNTING TENSION AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITHIN HIS COMMUNITY. TURKEY, AND DENKTASH HIMSELF, COULD HELP BY GIVING ENOUGH TO GET A NEGOTIATION GOING AND SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM THAT WAS SO IMPORTANT TO CLERIDES SURVIVAL. CRAWFORD

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